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CUSTOMS CENSORSHIP AND THE CHARTER:
THE LITTLE SISTERS CASE
Brenda-Cossman and Bruce Ryder
INTRODUCTION
Little Sisters Book and Art Emporium is
Vancouver's only bookstore specializing in gay and
lesbian literature; it also has served as a focus of
social and political activities of the local gay and
lesbian communities since its inception in 1983.
Canada Customs is the arm of the federal govermnent
empowered to prohibit the entry of obscene imported
publications into the country, a power originally
enacted in 1847.1 It is hard to think of two better
institutional representatives of the urban diversity of
contemporary Canada and the country's fusty Victor-
ian roots, respectively. For the past decade, they
have been embroiled in dramatic and escalating legal
battles - appropriately dubbed "Little Sister v. Big
Brother" by the Globe and Mail.2 It appeared at times
that only one party might survive. Little Sisters has
been at risk of financial collapse in the face of
persistent detentions and seizures of its imported
material. Customs censorship practices, in turn,
appeared to be treading on constitutional thin ice. In
its court challenge, Little Sisters argued that the
provisions of the Customs Act and Customs Tariff that
together empower officials to stop obscene represen-
tations at the border3 constitute unreasonable restric-
tions on freedom of expression and equality rights
protected by section 2(b) and section 15 of the
Charter. Customs censorship practices, finally lifted
from over a century of administrative darkness and
exposed to the glare of a two month court proceeding
in the fall of 1994," appeared vulnerable to constitu-
tional invalidation.
However, in a long-awaited judgment released in
January 1996,' Justice Kenneth Smith of the British
Columbia Supreme Court crafted a ruling that, in true
Canadian fashion, found a middle ground. He man-
aged to vindicate, and sought to preserve, both Little
Sisters and Customs by affirming the importance to
the life of the nation of both homosexual literature
and the existing legislative regime of border censor-
ship.
It took Justice Smith a full thirteen months to
ponder the evidence presented at trial and to prepare
his decision. The care he took is evident in the
thorough and meticulous presentation of the evidence
and legal argument, and in the respect he accorded to
all participants in the proceedings. He noted the
cultural and political significance of Little Sisters as
"a nerve-centre for the homosexual community. "6 A
refreshing sensitivity to the importance of lesbian and
gay sexual expression is similarly evident in his
affirmation of testimony by Little Sisters' witnesses
that:
7
... sexual text and imagery produced for
homosexuals serves as an affirmation of
their sexuality and as a socializing force;
that it normalizes the sexual practices that
the larger society has historically considered
to be deviant; and that it organizes homosex-
uals as a group and enhances their political
power.
Moreover, Little Sisters' long-standing com-
plaints regarding the vagaries of Customs censorship
were vindicated by many of Smith J.'s factual find-
ings. In particular, he found that since its inception in
1983, Little Sisters has suffered at the hands of
Customs;8 that gay and lesbian bookstores and
publications are particularly vulnerable to the "arbit-
rary consequences" of Customs censorship far out of
proportion to their relative share of imported
material;9 that "there are many examples of inconsist-
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encies in Customs' treatment of publications" ;10 that
delays of months or even years in making determina-
tions are not uncommon;11 that a great many "quali-
tatively questionable" determinations are made,
including the detention of a "disturbing amount of
homosexual art and literature that is arguably not
obscene";" that Customs continued to ban any
depiction of anal penetration until the eve of the trial
in 1994 despite the lack of legal authority to do so
and despite the advice tendered by Department of
Justice lawyers in 1992 that Customs was acting
illegally;13 that there is no mechanism in Customs'
procedures for receiving evidence of a book's merits
and thus many books are ruled obscene without
adequate evidence; 14 that Customs officers are inad-
equately trained, many receiving only a few hours of
instruction on obscenity law;' 5 that highly publicized
works like Madonna's Sex and Bret Easton Ellis'
American Psycho are given the benefit of the doubt;' 6
that Customs officers "do not have sufficient time
available to consistently do a proper job" and thus
take "short cuts" by "such expedients as thumbing
through books"; 7 and that few initial determinations
of obscenity are appealed, and of the few that are,
few succeed.' 8 In conclusion, Justice Smith wrote
with some understatement, there are "grave systemic
problems in the customs administration." 9
Surprisingly, this litany of disturbing factual
findings did not spell the demise of the challenged
legislation. Justice Smith held that the prohibition on
imported obscenity did not discriminate against gay
men and lesbians and, therefore, section 15 of the
Charter was not implicated. It was, of course,
beyond doubt that the prohibition of obscene repre-
sentations at the border violated freedom of express-
ion protected by section 2(b) of the Charter. This
issue was conceded by the Crown. However, Smith
J. went on to uphold the legislation as a reasonable
limit under section 1 of the Charter. The constitu-
tional, validity of the legislation was sustained in large
part by Smith J.'s attribution of the sole responsibility
for the serious violations identified in his judgment to
the flawed administration of the legislation by Cus-
toms officials rather than to the legislation itself. In
the result, he held that the legislation was consistent
with the Charter, and thus Little Sisters was not
entitled to the declaration of invalidity it sought under
section 52 of the Constitution Act, 1982. Justice
Smith held that the proper remedy when an otherwise
valid law has been administered in a manner that
violates rights or freedoms is to issue a declaration
under section 24 of the Charter. He therefore issued
a declaration that "from time to time during the
period covered by the evidence at trial some customs
officers have acted arbitrarily and have thereby
infringed sections 2(b) and 15(l)".21
A month after Smith J.'s initial ruling, Little
Sisters returned to court seeking an injunction to
restrain Customs from detaining imported material
destined for the bookstore until the systemic problems
identified in the judgment had been remedied. Justice
Smith declined to issue such an injunction, finding
that Customs had already revised its procedures "to
require more careful consideration by qualified
officers of possibly-obscene books." 21 In his view,
these were "reasonable first steps and should achieve
the objective until a more comprehensive administra-
tive scheme can be put in place."2 2 However, he did
issue a more limited injunction restraining Customs
officials from subjecting Little Sisters to a policy of
heightened scrutiny at the Vancouver Mail Centre
"until the federal Crown satisfies this Court that the
discretion of customs officers in that office is guided
by appropriate standards."
23
We have no quarrel with the declaration and the
injunction issued by Smith J. - these remedies were
amply justified on the evidence presented. With all
due respect, however, it is our view that the judge
erred in absolving the Customs Act and Customs
Tariff of responsibility for the grave systemic prob-
lems that led to the violation of the claimants' Char-
ter rights. In our view, these effects are closely tied
to the deficiencies in the procedures set out in the
Customs Act for the determination of whether
imported publications are obscene, and thus a declar-
ation of invalidity ought to have issued in relation to
the impugned provisions.
The Little Sisters case raises complex issues that,
as Smith J. noted, "are of great importance not only
to the plaintiffs but to all Canadians."24 The case is
on its way to the British Columbia Court of Appeal,
and, in all likelihood, will end up before the Supreme
Court of Canada. We cannot possibly do justice to
the issues raised here. We will restrict ourselves to
brief comments on four aspects of Justice Smith's
opinion that we find unsatisfying. The first is his
conclusion that the effects of the legislation do not
amount to discrimination against gay men and les-
bians in violation of section 15 of the Charter. The
second is his reliance on the reasoning of the
Supreme Court in the Butler case to support the
conclusion that homosexual representations pose a
risk of harm to society and, therefore, can be sup-
pressed without violating the Charter. The third is his
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choice of a standard of review under section 1 of the
Charter that was highly deferential to the government
on the question of whether the Customs legislation
constitutes the least restrictive means of regulating
imported obscenity. In our view, a rigourous standard
of review under section 1 is appropriate where
legislation in its effects has a disproportionate impact
on expression central to the cultural identity and
political vitality of a disadvantaged minority. Finally,
we want to challenge what we see as a crucial flaw in
Smith J.'s reasoning, namely, his view that the
violation of the plaintiffs' rights cannot be linked to
the procedural deficiencies in the Customs Act itself.
EQUAUTY RIGHTS
To establish a section 15 violation, a claimant
must first show that the purpose or effect of the
impugned legislation is to impose a burden on the
basis of an enumerated or analogous ground of
discrimination. Then the claimant must demonstrate
that the unequal treatment is discriminatory, meaning
that it is the result of the stereotypical application of
presumed group or personal characteristics.' While
the prohibition on imported obscene representations
does not have as its purpose the imposition of dispro-
portionate burdens on gay men and lesbians, this is
one of its effects. Justice Smith reached this con-
clusion by a circuitous and controversial route. After
making some astute observations regarding the
cultural and political significance of homosexual
representations to gay men and lesbians, he wrote:26
Because sexual practices are so integral to
homosexual culture, any law proscribing
representations of sexual practices will
necessarily affect homosexuals to a greater
extent than it will other groups in society, to
whom representations of sexual practices are
much less significant and for whom such
representations play a relatively marginal
role in art and literature.
For this reason, he concluded that the legal category
of obscenity, even when properly interpreted, will
inevitably capture a disproportionate amount of
homosexual expression. Hence, the plaintiffs "and
other homosexuals" had been "adversely affected" by
the law as a result of their sexual orientation.27
However, the Court went on to conclude that this
unequal treatment did not amount to discrimination.
Unfortunately relying on the minority approach to
section 15 in recent Supreme Court cases,2" Smith J.
noted that a distinction based on an analogous ground
will only be discriminatory if it is irrelevant "to the
functional values of the legislation." In his view the
unequal treatment which gays and lesbians experience
as a result of the prohibition on obscenity does not
arise from "the stereotypical application of presumed
group or personal characteristics." According to the
Court, the "characteristic is a real one" that is
relevant to the legislative values: "Sexuality is
relevant because obscenity is defined in terms of
sexual practices." Justice Smith reiterated his view
that the disproportionate effect of obscenity law on
gays and lesbians is inevitable because of the extent
to which their very identities are constructed in and
through sexual practices. He concluded that "homo-
sexual obscenity is proscribed because it is obscene,
not because it is homosexual. The disadvantageous
effect on homosexuals is unavoidable .... "29 In his
view, the distinction thus could not be seen to be
discriminatory within the meaning of section 15.
In our view, there are a number of problems
with Smith J.'s section 15 reasoning. Even if we
accept his premise that artistic expression produced
for homosexual audiences is permeated to a greater
degree than heterosexual expression is by sexual
themes, his conclusion regarding the disproportionate
impact of obscenity law does not necessarily follow.
Obscenity, after all, embraces only a subset of sexual
representations. Depictions of non-violent adult
sexuality are obscene only if they are degrading or
dehumanizing and pose a substantial risk of harm to
society. Thus, Smith J.'s conclusion that there exists
a disproportionate share of homosexual obscenity is
correct under existing Canadian obscenity law only if
sexual violence, child sexuality, or sexual degradation
are more commonly and unduly exploited as the
dominant characteristics of expression produced for
homosexual audiences than they are for others. No
evidence was presented at trial to sustain such a
controversial proposition; we know of no studies that
could support it. Furthermore, Justice Smith noted
that Little Sisters has a policy of not stocking material
that depicts paedophilia, violence towards women, or
misogyny,' ° and there was no indication in the judg-
ment that this policy had been neglected. In sum, the
premise that homosexual expression generally, and
material imported by Little Sisters specifically,
contains a disproportionate share of obscenity strikes
us as implausible and certainly not sustainable on the
evidence presented.
Further, in finding that the unequal burden on
gays and lesbians was not discriminatory, Smith J.
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conveniently shifted the focus away from the possibil-
ity that the state is targeting the representations of a
marginalized sexual group. He saw the law's sup-
pression of gay and lesbian sexual imagery as not a
question of discrimination, but simply one of obscen-
ity: publications are censored because they are
obscene. The issue that is completely obscured in this
reasoning is whether the material is considered to be
obscene simply because it is gay or lesbian.
Justice Smith's conclusions here may be related
to continuing problems with the obscenity standard,
and particularly, with the meaning of degrading and
dehumanizing. In Butler, the Supreme Court held that
materials would be degrading if they were perceived
to cause harm in the form of anti-social behaviour.3'
Although the Ontario Court of Appeal has
subsequently held that some proof of harm is
required, 2 the nature of that proof remains elusive.
33
The continuing reliance on notional community
standards in deciding whether it is reasonable to
apprehend harm means that sexually explicit material
continues to be assessed in terms of whether judges
believe that the community reasonably believes that
the materials cause harm. In the context of gay and
lesbian materials, social prejudices can and do
continue to inform these community standards, so
that the community can be said to believe these
images do cause harm.' And the fact that no expert
evidence is required to prove the community standard
of tolerance only further heightens the vulnerablity of
gay and lesbian sexual imagery to being suppressed
as obscene.
Justice Smith's decision did not challenge these
problematic aspects of the community standards test.
Despite his recognition of the importance of sexual
expression to the gay and lesbian community, Smith
J. was willing to assume that a greater share of gay
and lesbian sexual material can be validly suppressed
as obscene. This conclusion would satisfy those who
believe that gay and lesbian sexual material is, by
definition, more degrading and dehumanizing than
heterosexual pornography. Although Smith J. would
reject such prejudicial views, his reliance on unsub-
stantiated assumptions nevertheless allowed some of
their implications to inadvertently creep back into the
decision.
In our view, a section 15 violation was made out
on the evidence without following the questionable
chain of reasoning pursued by Justice Smith. Else-
where in the judgment, Smith J. found that the
arbitrary consequences of Customs censorship are
borne disproportionately by gay and lesbian book-
stores and publications, and that a disturbingly large
amount of homosexual art and literature that is
arguably not obscene is detained. 5 These findings
provide strong support for the conclusion that the
legislation had a disparate impact on gays and les-
bians resulting from the stereotypical application of
group characteristics. However, Smith J. considered
these findings to be irrelevant to the question of
whether the legislation violated equality rights. In his
view, the arbitrary burdensome effects were a prod--
uct not of the legislation but of its flawed
administration by Customs officials, a distinction we




Justice Smith held that the government was
correct to concede that the legislation violated section
2(b) of the Charter. He went on to find that this
violation was a reasonable limit under section 1. In
so holding, he relied heavily on the reasoning of the
Supreme Court of Canada in the Butler decision,
where the criminal prohibition on obscenity was
similarly upheld as a reasonable limit on Charter
rights.
Little Sisters attempted to distinguish Butler on
the grounds that its reasoning should be limited to
heterosexual obscenity. In discussing the risk of
"harm to society" created by obscene representations
in Butler, Sopinka J. repeatedly emphasized the
alleged degradation of women in heterosexual
pornography. 6 Little Sisters argued that the risk of
such harm could not and should not be said to arise
from lesbian and gay sexual representations.37 Justice
Smith did not agree. First, in his view, the
pornographic materials at issue in Butler did include
homosexual representations. While the Supreme
Court did not directly comment on these
representations, Smith J. argued that it is "implicit"
in the Butler decision that they can be suppressed as
obscene without violating the Charter.3 8 The fact that
these so-called homosexual representations were set
within sexually explicit material directed primarily to
a heterosexual audience was not discussed. Rather,
the judge's view appeared to be that the depiction of
same-sex sexual relations made the material
homosexual. 39 Secondly, Smith J. followed the
dominant view, expressed by Wilson J. in Towne
Cinenw, that the community standards test does not
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permit the courts to take into account the specific
audience to which allegedly obscene material is
directed. Rather, it is a single national community
standard of tolerance that is determinative. This
approach effectively ignores the specificity of gay and
lesbian sexual representations. The point is not
simply that the audience is different, but that the
entire framework of production, distribution, and
consumption of gay and lesbian sexually explicit
material is fundamentally different; the meaning and
importance of the materials cannot be measured
according to a heterosexual framework, least of all
one based on harm towards women.41
In the end, Smith J. held that implicit in the
Butler decision was a finding of sufficient grounds to
suspect a causal relationship between pornography
produced for homosexual audiences and harm to
society. He thus found it unnecessary to his decision
to canvass the social science evidence on point.
Nevertheless, he went on to do so. In assessing this
evidence, he relied on the Supreme Court's view in
Butler that the absence of proof of a direct causal link
between pornography and harm to society is not fatal;
it is enough to demonstrate a "reasoned apprehension
of harm. "42 Applying this standard to the issue of gay
and lesbian sexual expression, Smith J. found that it
was enough that there was one expert who believed
that this material presents a risk of harm, even
though that expert's conclusions on this point were
not supported by the other expert evidence presented
at trial.43 Despite Smith J.'s earlier recognition of the
importance of sexual representations to the lesbian
and gay community, here the unique nature of these
representations was glossed over. Gay and lesbian
pornography was simply assumed to cause the same
harm to society - harm that need not be proven and,
in fact, harm that need not even be clearly
articulated. Justice Smith did not describe the precise
nature of the harm, apart from commenting that the
exposure to this material "may cause the kinds of
changes in attitudes, emotions and behaviours
identified in Butler as harmful to society."'
SECTION 1 STANDARD OF
REVIEW
In upholding the challenged Customs legislation
under section 1, Justice Smith applied an
extraordinarily lax standard of review, particularly at
the minimal impairment stage of the Oakes45 analysis.
He acknowledged that the "means chosen here by
Parliament are not the least drastic means available of
achieving the objective. " ' ' In his view, however,
Supreme Court precedents that have watered down
this aspect of the Oakes test have absolved the Crown
of the responsibility "to establish that it has chosen
the least drastic means available to achieve that
objective.""' In fact, the Crown made no attempt to
explain why Parliament had rejected other systems of
border censorship that might have a less serious
impact on freedom of expression and equality
rights.48  Indeed, no such evidence could be
forthcoming, since the adequacy of the existing
system of Customs censorship has never been the
subject of a serious examination in the House of
Commons or in any other government forum prior to
the Little Sisters case. Even as the legal landscape has
been transformed over the decades by the increasing
complexity of obscenity law and the advent of the
Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Parliament has not
undertaken a review of the wisdom of leaving
determinations of the legality of publications with
individual agents of the Department of National
Revenue.' 9 Similar legal developments in other
democratic societies have prompted heated debates
and attempts to reform Customs censorship to better
secure fundamental freedoms.' In sharp contrast, an
examination of the history of Customs censorship in
Canada reveals a remarkable record of legislative
complacency.5"
Justice Smith's conclusion that Customs
legislation imposes reasonable limits on freedom of
expression was grounded, in part, on the view,
expressed by Sopinka J. in Butler, that "obscenity is
a base form of expression, far from the core values
underlying free expression."2 It is now well-
established in Supreme Court jurisprudence that the
rigour of the standard of justification to which
governments will be held under section 1 will vary in
direct relation to the degree to which the expression
at issue enhances the purposes of section 2(b).53 We
would add that the degree to which expression is
closely related to the purposes of other Charter
provisions should also be taken into account in the
selection of the appropriate standard of review.
The connection and interaction between equality
rights and freedom of expression is a distinct and
important feature of the Little Sisters litigation. For
the gay and lesbian community, the violation of these
rights are fundamentally intersecting. The concept of
intersectionality and interactive discrimination has
examined the ways in which individuals and groups
may be subject to multiple and inseparable forms of
discrimination.54 Although these concepts were
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initially developed in relation to the unique forms of
discrimination experienced by women of colour
which could not be adequately described as either sex
or race discrimination, the concepts have since begun
to be extended to the ways in which other groups
similarly experience multiple and inseparable forms
of discrimination. For example, in the context of the
legal struggle for recognition of gay and lesbian
relationships, the intervenors in the Mossop case at
the Supreme Court tried to illustrate the way in which
discrimination on the basis of familial status and
sexual orientation were intricately connected for gay
men and lesbians.5 The concept of interactive
discrimination has thus begun to focus on the
different and unique ways in which particular groups
experience multiple forms of discrimination.
In our view, this analysis needs to be extended
beyond discrimination and equality rights to include
the ways in which different rights violations also
intersect and interact to produce distinct forms of
disadvantage. 6 In the context of censorship of
sexually explicit materials, the rights violations that
are experienced by the gay and lesbian community
cannot be adequately described by separating the
violation of their equality rights and the violation of
their freedom of expression. Rather, the way in
which this censorship violates both of these rights is
fundamentally interconnected. More specifically, the
way in which the gay and lesbian community
experiences the violation of their freedom of
expression is not just like the way the heterosexual
community experiences the violation of this freedom.
The violation of the freedom of expression has a
disparate impact on the gay and lesbian community
because of the importance of sexual expression to the
political identity of that community. It can be further
argued that the nature of the violation of freedom of
expression is discriminatory because of the way in
which the obscenity law is applied to gay and lesbian
materials. The unsubstantiated belief that there is a
disproportionate amount of homosexual obscenity is
informed by the underlying assumption that gay and
lesbian sexual imagery is in and of itself
disproportionately degrading. In the language of
section 15 jurisprudence, the conclusion is one that is
reached by the stereotypical application of presumed
group characteristics, that is, the prevailing belief that
gay and lesbian sexuality is itself degrading.
The evidence in the Little Sisters case established
that one of the effects of the application of the
Customs Tariff and the Customs Act was to catch, not
just "base" forms of expression, but also a great deal
of homosexual expression closely related to the
purposes of both section 2(b) and section 15. As
Smith J. acknowledged, erotica produced for homo-
sexuals furthers the values of "seeking and attaining
truth, participating in social and political decision-
making, and cultivating the diversity of forms of
individual self-fulfilment and human flourishing in a
tolerant and welcoming environment."" Similarly, by
affirming homosexuality, by overcoming the stigma
attached to sexual practices that the larger society has
labelled deviant and depraved, and by helping form
a political and cultural identity, sexual expression for
gay men and lesbians is intimately tied to the pur-
poses of section 15. It assists in promoting human
dignity and freedom and in overcoming historical
disadvantage by challenging attitudes that are the
product of stereotype and prejudice.
A government scheme of administrative censor-
ship that has a disparate impact on expression of
crucial importance to the identity and political vitality
of a stigmatized and historically disadvantaged
minority ought to be a matter of serious concern in a
free and democratic society. Unfortunately, the
connections between equality and expressive interests
were not made in Smith J.'s section 1 analysis.
Instead of recognizing the equality dimension of the
freedom of expression violation, he approached the
question exclusively from the point of view of section
2(b) jurisprudence. As discussed above, Smith J. was
content to simply follow the reasoning of the
Supreme Court in the Butler decision, and to con-
clude that the harm caused by pornography, whether
heterosexual or homosexual, was sufficient to justify
the limitation on freedom of expression. As a result,
the intersectionality of the rights violations for the
gay and lesbian community - the way in which the
denial of freedom of expression discriminates on the
basis of sexual orientation, which is really the crux of
the Little Sisters case - was left unexplored in the
section 1 analysis.
THE PROCEDURAL DEFICIENCIES
OF THE CUSTOMS ACT
Justice Smith's conclusion that the challenged
provisions of the Customs Act and the Customs Tariff
were constitutionally justifiable limits on freedom of
expression was supported in large part by his view
that the egregious problems revealed by the evidence
were not caused by the law, but rather were the
result of the faulty application of the law by Customs
officials. 8 With all due respect, we believe he was
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mistaken in not concluding that the arbitrary and
unequal impact of Customs' determinations are
closely tied to the procedural deficiencies of the
Customs Act.
For example, it is no great surprise that many
qualitatively questionable determinations are made
given that section 58 of the Customs Act empowers an
officer, defined simply as a person employed in the
administration of the Act, to determine the tariff
classification of all imported goods, including
whether publications should be prohibited as obscene.
The statute makes no attempt to ensure that the
designated officers have any relevant training or
opportunity to develop expertise. The same is true of
the officers empowered to render decisions on
requests for re-determination, namely "Tariff and
Values Administrators" at the first level of internal
appeal (sections 59, 60), and the Deputy Minister of
National Revenue at the second level (section 63).
Whether these decision-makers will have any
training, experience or expertise in relation to
obscenity law is a matter the statute leaves to pure
chance.
Consider further the matter of delays in making
final determinations. Lengthy delays are a common
experience, as Smith J. noted.5 9 This is a particularly
serious concern in the case of imported periodicals,
the contents of which quickly become stale-dated. For
example, when Little Sisters sought to appeal the
prohibition of the gay magazine "The Advocate",
their position was not vindicated until 16 months after
the initial determination.' In the most recent of the
rare occasions that an importer has had the
persistence to appeal a Customs prohibition all the
way to court, the Glad Day case, a court ruling was
not obtained until two and one half years after the
initial ruling. 6' The structure of the appeals process in
the Customs Act fosters such lengthy delays.
Importers can appeal to court (sections 67, 71) but
only after they have pursued requests for re-
determination under section 60 and section 63. The
statute places no time constraints on the rendering of
decisions on requests for re-determination: it contains
only a vague and unenforceable exhortation to the
officials in question to render decisions "with all due
dispatch" (section 60(3); section 63(3)).62 It would be
a simple matter to design a more streamlined and
expedited re-determination process. Specific time
constraints could be added. Two levels of internal
appeal are entirely unnecessary, especially since they
are rarely successful and often amount to little more
than pro forma ratifications of initial determinations.
The statute makes no assurance of an escalation in the
quality of the "hearing"6 3 or the competence of the
decision-makers as one proceeds up the Customs
hierarchy.
Furthermore, the statute does not require the
section 58, section 60 or section 63 decision-makers
to receive any evidence. No procedures for
introducing evidence are set out, and none have been
implemented by Customs. There is no requirement
that a record be compiled or that reasons be given
and, as a result, these things do not occur. Importers
are not even informed of which parts of a periodical
or book have been found to run afoul of obscenity
law. All of these deficiencies render the appeal rights
set out in the legislation illusory. The notion that the
routine adjudication of the boundary between
constitutionally-protected expression and obscenity by
Customs officials is supervised by legal norms is a
formal mirage rather than a practical reality.
Apart from the right to appeal the Deputy
Minister's re-determination to court,' no special
procedures are established by the Act for the
determination of whether or not publications are to be
classified as prohibited. The legislative policy of the
Canadian government appears to be that such
determinations are to be treated as raising legal issues
no different in difficulty or importance than those
raised by the determination of the correct tariff on
other goods. The elementary point that other tariff
classifications have nothing to do with freedom of
expression appears to have been overlooked in the
drafting of the legislation. The conclusion is
inescapable, in our view, that the enforcement of
Tariff Code 9956(a) through the procedures set out in
the Customs Act cannot reasonably be characterized
as a legislative scheme that minimally impairs
Charter rights.
As obscenity law has become more complicated
over time, the procedural deficiencies of the Customs
Act have become increasingly anachronistic.
Whatever the merits of giving censorship powers to
Customs officers in the Victorian times when the law
was first enacted, it is absurd to ask inadequately
trained and qualified officers, without the benefit of
even a rudimentary hearing, to determine whether
publications fall within current understandings of the
obscene. In the old days, in fact until the 1950s, smut
was smut; all sexual representations were considered
obscene. Whatever else can be said of it, at least this
definition had the merit of simplicity. When Revenue
Minister McCann said in Parliament in 1949 that
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"you do not have to be a great literary critic to tell
the difference between decency and filth,"' he was
not mischaracterizing the obscenity law of the time,
however wrong we may now think he was.
The law is much more complicated now. The
1959 amendments to the Criminal Code require
judges to assess obscene works as a whole to
determine whether they unduly exploit sexual themes
as their dominant characteristic. Since the early
1960s, the courts have held that the presence of
artistic merit, to be determined with the assistance of
expert evidence, will rebut any finding of undue
exploitation.' And since the 1992 Butler decision,
non-violent depictions of adult sexuality are generally
legal; they are obscene only if they can be said to be
"degrading or dehumanizing" and if the Crown can
prove that they pose a substantial risk of harm to
society.67 The tasks of determining artistic merit and
substantial risk of harm to society, as well as the
meaning of the notoriously vague concepts of
degrading and dehumanizing, befuddle even our most
intelligent judges who have had the benefit of days of
expert testimony. Legislation that asks Customs
officers to make the same determinations on a routine
basis with no assistance places everyone, including
those officers, in an absurd situation.
CONCLUSION
In our view, the evidence and the law point
clearly to the conclusion that the combined effect of
the Customs Act and the Customs Tarriff violate
sections 2(b) and 15 of the Charter in the case of the
administration of the Tariff Code prohibition on
obscene representations. Justice Smith 's findings on
the importance of sexual expression to the gay and
lesbian community, and on the disproportionate
impact of Customs censorship on gay and lesbian
materials, ought to have led to the conclusion that the
legislation in its effects violates section 15. On the
question of whether the violation of section 2(b) was
a reasonable limit, we believe that Smith J. ought to
have exercised greater caution in assuming that the
reasoning in Butler could be extended, without
hestitation or problematization, to gay and lesbian
sexual imagery. Justice Smith acknowledged that
many of the publications suppressed by Customs are
integral to the cultural and political identity of a
disadvantaged and stigmatized sexual minority. Thus
their distribution fosters goals that lie at the heart of
the Charter's protection of expression and equality
interests in sections 2(b) and 15, respectively. For
this reason, we believe that Smith J. erred in not
holding the government to a rigourous standard of
justification at the section 1 stage of the analysis. We
have also taken issue with Smith J.'s failure to
implicate the procedural deficiencies of the Customs
Act in the Charter violations identified by the
evidence. In our view, at the very least, a system of
administrative censorship cannot constitute a minimal
impairment of Charter rights if it makes little or no
attempt to ensure that decisions will be made
expeditiously by expert decision-makers who.have the
ability to receive evidence of a publication's merits.
The Customs Act fails this test. So long as Tariff
Code 9956(a) is enforced through its procedures, the
problems identified in the Little Sisters case are likely
to persist. l
Brenda Cossman
Osgoode Hall Law School, York University.
Bruce Ryder
Osgoode Hall Law School, York University.
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